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THE CONCEPTS OF MIND AND MATTER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

У статті розглядається проблема визначення змісту понять свідомості та матерії, який є смислоутворюючим для психофізичної проблеми, дозволяючи коректно представити розходження між позиціями матеріалізму, дуалізму, ідеалізму та панпсихізму, і який є незалежним від різноманіття існуючих наукових теорій та їх історичного розвитку. Обґрунтовується думка, що цим вимогам відповідає феноменальне поняття свідомості як особистої царини суб'єктивності та поняття матерії (фізичної реальності) як концептуально зводимого до просторового розташування та його змін з часом (фізичного руху).

Ключові слова: свідомість, матерія, фізичний, психічний, просторовий, закономірність, суб'єктивний, феноменальний.

Problem setting. The problem of the understanding of the relationship between the mental (mind) and the physical (matter, in particular and in the first hand, the human body and brain) is an eternal philosophical problem that does not lose its actuality; it is one of the central and the most controversial problems in the modern analytical philosophy, which dominates in English-speaking countries. Sometimes, discussions on this issue get at a deadlock because their participants use the fundamental concepts in different meanings or change meanings in the process. Hence the importance of a clear specification of the contents of the fundamental concepts – the contents that is constitutive for the problem – and abiding this contents throughout the discussion. In particular, an appropriate account has to be taken of the discussion by A. F. Losev in the book *The Dialectics of Myth* [1, p. 111-113], where the author keenly formulates the problem of the contents of the concept of matter, elucidates its difficulties and criticizes major available approaches.

Recent research and publication analysis. In a more recent philosophical literature, important relevant considerations can be found in works by T. Nagel, J. Searle, D. Chalmers, W. Hasker. These authors agree in that the definitive feature of the mind (mental states) in the sense relevant to the problem is subjective (or, in more technical terms, “phenomenal”) character. As for physical reality (matter), the following definitive features are proposed: properties that are discoverable “by explanatory inference from those already in the class” of physical properties, in the “repeated process” that “starts from a base of familiar, observable spatio-temporal phenomena” [2, p. 183], objectivity [3], “structural and dynamical

properties” [4, p. 121], “fundamentally nonteleological” [5, p. 63]. These suggestions are elucidating but still need critical assessment in the light of Losev’s argued objections against similar propositions.

The objective of the article is to specify the contents of the concepts of mind (mental) and matter (physical) that is constitutive for the mind-body problem and accounts for the differences between the positions of materialism, dualism, idealism and panpsychism.

The main material

1. The concepts of phenomenal mind and mental subject

The concept of mind in the context of the mind-body problem encompasses all that belong to the *personal realm of subjectivity* of a human being or an animal: sensations, perceptions, emotions, thoughts, desires, our awareness and understanding of the world and ourselves. The determinative feature of all mental states and processes, that is, of all that belongs to the mind, is their subjective character – that they are *subjectively experienced* by a person and that the person is *subjectively aware* of them. It is also important that different mental states and processes have a *specific subjective quality* – what it is like (how it feels) for a person to experience this mental state (process) rather than some other. There is something what it is like for a person to feel pain, or to have a certain (visual, or auditory, or olfactory, or gustatory, or tactile) perceptory experience, or to experience a certain emotion, or to be aware of this or that, and this what-it-is-likeness (subjective quality) is different for experiences of different kinds.

As all these experiences should be someone’s experiences (there cannot be a pain without someone who feels it, a thought without someone thinking it, a desire without someone who desires it, etc.), some philosophers point out (I think, quite correctly) that the concept of a *mental subject* is in a sense more fundamental than the concept of mind. A mental subject is a bearer, or an experiencer, of various mental states (processes) – the one whose states (sensations, emotions, thoughts, desires) they are, who experiences them (subjectively). It is what we usually call “the self”. Accordingly, the mind can be defined as a dynamic complex (system) of all subjective states of a mental subject. The mind and the mental subject (the self) as an entity that experiences and thinks is a “thing” we are familiar with in the most direct way, of which we have the most direct knowledge (whereas our acquaintance with physical reality and our knowledge of it is mediated – by organs of sense, the brain, and the mind). At the same time, the mind and its various states (feelings, emotions, thoughts, and wishes) are something very mysterious. They cannot be observed from the outside, seen, or palpated; they have no size, form, and colour; they can not be measured by a ruler or some more complex device. Throughout many centuries, philosophers have debated on what is the mind (consciousness) and what is its relation with the material world, physical reality – the world of physical bodies, which have certain sizes, forms, colours, and spatial locations relative to one another, change their locations with time, and can be observed from outside, seen, palpated, measured, photographed, and depicted.

We know, from science, that the mind (mental states) is dependent on certain physical structures and processes in the body – the nervous system and the brain. However, if we observe (through some special device) how the nervous system and the brain work, we will see some physical bodies which move, change their form, contract, or expand – but we cannot see feelings or thoughts. Feelings can only be directly felt by someone as her own feelings; thoughts can only be thought by someone and be present in her conscious awareness as the content of her own thinking – both feelings and thoughts are unobservable from outside. Certainly, we can observe *outward manifestations* of feelings. However, outward manifestations of feelings are not feelings themselves. By seeing someone's face expression, we can guess what she feels. However, we do not see pain, grief, or joy – we only guess about these feelings as far as we know from experience how a person usually (often) looks and behaves if she feels pain, grief, or joy. We would not know what are the *feelings* of pain or joy (how they feel), if we *ourselves* never *felt* them, if we only *observed from outside* people's looks and behaviours or processes in their brains.

The above-specified concept of mind has to be clearly distinguished from the concept of mind that dominated the philosophy of mind and “mainstream psychology” of the 20th century – the behaviouristic-functionalist concept of mind, which identifies mind (consciousness) with the corresponding forms of behaviour and with functional structures of the intra-bodily physical processes responsible for these forms of behaviour. From the point of view of behaviourism a certain sensation or emotion (for example, a feeling of pain or pleasure) is not how we experience it subjectively (*how it is for a person* – to feel pain or pleasure); it is nothing but external manifestations of these feelings – how a person who has them behaves. From the point of view of functionalism, a sensation or emotion is nothing but a functional structure of those processes in the brain that cause these external manifestations, behaviour. It is clear that these concepts of mind – the common sense *versus* the behaviouristic-functionalist concept – are very different by meaning, despite the same spelling. We can imagine a body that is an exact physical copy of the body of some person, but has no *subjective experiences and subjective awareness*. Various parts of this body make exactly the same externally observable movements (behaviour), and exactly the same physical processes occur in its brain – but all this occurs *without any feelings and understanding* (in the usual, *subjective* sense), automatically, as a result of interactions of parts and particles of the body according to physical laws. Just as well, it is possible to imagine a mind that is capable of subjective experiences and thought without a brain, and without a body.

For the moment, we are not discussing the question: Is it really (as a matter of the existing natural order) possible for such a body (brain) to exist without a mind, or for a mind to exist without a brain? Here, we are concerned only with making it clear that *the concepts* of mind (of consciousness, feelings, emotions, thinking, understanding) have *quite different meanings* from whatever concepts of behaviour, processes in the brain, and their functions. The concepts of mind (of

consciousness, sensations, emotions, thinking, understanding) *mean*, in the usual human sense, not patterns of behaviour or processes in the brain or their functions, but how we experience something *subjectively* and our *subjective* awareness, thinking, understanding, *how it for us*.

To prevent confusion, let us use the term “phenomenal mind” to designate the mind (consciousness) in the usual sense – one that encompasses *subjective* mental states – as distinct from the behaviouristic-functionalist sense. It is important to notice that it is the phenomenal mind – not the mind in the behaviouristic-functionalist sense – that gives rise to the mind-body problem and makes sense of the discussion between materialism, dualism, idealism and panpsychism. There is no *explanatory gap* between the physical processes and behavioural patterns or functions: any behaviour is a complex of physical movements of various parts of the body, and a function is a specific contribution to the maintenance of the integrity of an organism, which is a physical system, or to the control of its behaviour. However, there is a qualitative explanatory gap between the physical processes and subjectivity, the phenomenal mind. This gap gives rise to what D. Chalmers call “the hard problem of consciousness”: “The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of *experience*. ... even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience ... there may still remain a further unanswered question: *Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience?* ... There is an *explanatory gap* (a term due to Levine 1983) between the functions and experience. ... The facts about experience cannot be an automatic consequence of any physical account, as it is conceptually coherent that any given process could exist without experience. Experience ... is not *entailed* by the physical” [6, p. 201, 203, 208]. Accordingly, behaviourists and functionalists, although they pretend the materialistic explanation of the mind, in fact just misleadingly change the meanings and explain in materialistic terms something (behavioural patterns and functions) entirely different from what the mind-body problem (“the hard problem of consciousness”) is really about.

2. The concept of matter

The concept of matter covers all things and processes that *are perceived through external senses* (those of sight, touch, etc.). However, it also signifies many other things and processes, which really are not perceived (immediately) through the external senses but are supposed to exist and to be of the same nature and submit to the same natural laws as things and processes perceived through the external senses. As an example, we can take such microelements as atoms or electrons or some very distant stars or planets that nobody has ever seen. Some of them cannot be seen even through the most powerful microscopes and telescopes. Science discovers their existence by their influence on other material objects according to physical laws. What then is common for all things and processes that are called material? How can their common nature be described in the most exact way?

Some philosophers propose defining matter through the property I have mentioned above – that of being perceivable through external senses. Let us take, for example, the following definition by V. I. Lenin: “Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them” [7, p. 144-145]. There are several grave deficiencies with such a definition. First, a definition of matter that involves perception (sensations) cannot be properly applied to all things and processes that are acknowledged to be material, because a great multitude of such things and processes are not really perceived sensually (immediately). Second, it is logically incorrect to define matter through perception (subjective), because materialism assumes that the existence and properties of material objects are completely independent of perception (are completely objective). A. F. Losev justly remarked: “There is absolutely nothing subjective in the concept of matter, and the materialists themselves assert that matter is eternal and that it existed before life and before living things with all their perceptions and their sense-organs. ... The reference to the link with sense-organs does not, therefore, help in any way” [1, p. 112]. If our *perception is definitive for the concept of matter*, then matter is *by definition* secondary to perception. Such a definition may be acceptable only from the idealistic point of view. To have some neutral starting ground to discuss the question of the relation between matter and mind, we have to define matter not through perception, but through *objective properties*. We need to get a clear understanding of *what matter is by itself, objectively, independently of perception*. Otherwise we put ourselves in danger of getting hopelessly muddled.

I suppose this problem can be adequately solved by the physical definition of matter: *matter is physical reality* – everything (and nothing but) that can be described *exhaustively* by physical properties, such as spatial coordinates, size, form, direction of movement, velocity, acceleration, mass, electric charge, etc. (For the moment we leave open the question of the existence of some other reality.)

This definition can also be countered with some objections. Thus, A.F.Losev pointed out the existence of different physical theories of matter and their changes with the historical development of physics. I think this objection misses the point. The existence of different physical *theories* of matter – different theories about the structure and organization of matter – does not make impossible a common *meaning of the concept* of matter that is presupposed in all these theories and remains invariant (unchangeable) in the process of the development of physics. Atoms were once believed to be the smallest indivisible particles of matter. Then it was discovered that atoms consist of smaller particles, which, in their turn, consist of yet smaller ones – so it is not known whether there is a limit of divisibility at all. Such a property of matter as electric charge was unknown in the times of Newton; it is possible that there are some properties of matter that are still unknown and wait to be discovered. Nevertheless, these developments leave intact some common foundation that constitutes *the meaning of the concept of matter*.

Essentially, though imperfectly, this foundation was made explicit already in the XVII century by René Descartes.

Descartes' equivalent of the concept of matter is *the substance characterized by the attribute of extension* (in contrast to mind as the substance characterized by the attribute of thinking). *Sensu stricto*, such a definition of matter is not quite correct, for modern physics tells us about the existence of such material microparticles that are geometrical points in space rather than extended things. However, Descartes' idea can be corrected: *for the concept of matter, spatial and spatiotemporal properties – such as spatial coordinates, size, form, velocity, acceleration, etc. – are definitive. All other physical properties* (such as mass, electric charge, or field-properties) are auxiliaries introduced for the purpose of describing how (with what regularities) physical bodies move (i.e., how their location in space changes with time) and how they, with mediation of space, influence one another's movements. They are either properties to move in some *law-abiding way*, or properties to influence movements of other physical bodies and undergo movemental influences caused by other physical bodies or space in some *law-abiding way*. In this meaning, *all physical properties are reducible to spatial location and its changes with time*. I will call reducibility in this meaning *conceptual reducibility* to spatial location and its changes with time (or to spatiotemporal relations).

For example, the concept of mass signifies such a property of physical bodies: whenever a body X interacts with a body E, which is adopted by convention as a standard (unit) of mass, the proportion of accelerations of the bodies E and X is constant. This proportion is called the mass of the body X. In a like manner, the concept of electric charge can be defined. Physical fields are spatiotemporal distributions of the property of space to influence movements of physical bodies in some regular way. So, if the future development of physics will reveal the need to introduce some new physical properties, they will not *principally* differ from the old ones, in the sense that the new properties as well as the old ones will be conceptually reducible to spatial properties and their temporal dynamics.

Thus, notwithstanding the historical changes (development) of physics, there remains some invariant that is definitive for the concept of physical, or matter. Descartes called it *the attribute of extension*. To be more correct, we can call it *the attribute of spatial location* – or, yet more precisely, *the conceptual reducibility to spatial location and its changes with time*. This means that the contents and *raison d'être* of all concepts that signify-describe material (physical in a wide sense) reality is *exhausted by (reduced to)* their role in descriptions and predictions of spatial locations of physical bodies and their changes with time.

Accordingly, if the content and *raison d'être* of some concept are *not reducible* to the concept's role in descriptions and predictions of spatial locations-and-movements of physical bodies, then this concept means *something non-physical, non-material*. But this is just the situation with such concepts as “consciousness”, “sensation”, “feeling”, “pain”, “joy”, “thinking”, “desire”, “idea”,

“theory”, “meaning”, etc. The meaning in which we usually use these words is *conceptually irreducible* to the temporal dynamics of the spatial locations of physical bodies. Because what we usually mean by these words *exists*, it follows that materialism is false.

It is important to notice that the conceptual reducibility to spatial location and its changes with time holds not only for those properties and laws that are dealt with in the science of physics (properties and laws that are physical in the narrow sense), but also for all other properties and laws (regularities) that are *physical in the wide sense, or material*. This category encompasses all *chemical* properties and laws – for they are all nothing but regularities of *physical* movements of atoms, ions, and other microscopic physical bodies. The concept of matter (of the physical in the wide sense) as conceptually reducible to spatial locations and movements encompass also all those *biological* properties that belong to the *physiology* (locations and movements of physical bodies – cells, molecules, ions, atoms – inside animal or human bodies) and the *behaviour* of animals or human beings (changes of spatial locations of such physical bodies as paws, tails, heads, arms, legs, etc.). The same goes for instincts and reflexes as some regular patterns of behaviour, i.e., of physical movements of various parts of the body. They are all physical in the wide sense, although to describe them we use terms of biology, not of physics. Thus, “material”, “physical” in the wide sense that is pertinent to the discussion between materialism and its alternatives, means *conceptually reducible to spatial locations and their changes with time (movements)*.

Essentially, the physical (matter) boils down to but one basic property – spatial location that changes with time. All other physical properties, as well as all physical laws, are a conceptual superstructure built on this basic property – measures, patterns, regularities that we discover in the processes of changes of spatial locations of various bodies (relative one another), and designate with various names, such as “mass”, “electric charge”, “electromagnetic field”, “the law of gravity”, “instinct”, “reflex”, etc. In a bit more detail, physical reality or matter is: 1) space with several (three, according to usual conception) dimensions, which correspond to the same number of directions for the measurement of sizes (length, width, and height in three-dimensional space) and distances (three projections on the Cartesian datum lines) – a sort of universal container for all physical bodies; 2) physical bodies as bearers of spatiotemporal properties (relations): location in space, movement (change of spatial location with time), and influences on one another’s movements; 3) all properties (relations) that are conceptually reducible to spatial location and its changes with time. These are such properties as: spatial location: distances and directions toward other physical bodies or points in space (Cartesian coordinates), size (length, width, height), form;

temporal derivatives from spatial location: velocity, acceleration, etc.; constant patterns of movements; constant measures and patterns of influences of physical bodies on one another’s movements: mass, electric charge, etc.; constant measures and patterns of influences of space on movements of physical bodies –

physical (gravitational, electromagnetic) fields. It is important to notice that such properties as mass, electric charge, etc. (measures and patterns of influences on movements) belong to the category of material or physical (in the wide sense) *not in virtue of what they do, but in virtue of what they are* – not because they influence movements, but because they *are nothing but* constant measures or patterns of influences on movements. If we ask: What is mass or electric charge *in itself, besides spatiotemporal relations and influences*? The right answer is: nothing. The concepts of mass and electric charge are introduced *exceptionally* for the purposes of description and prediction of such relations and influences; *this exhausts their meaning*. That is why mass and electric charge are physical properties.

This directly concerns the question about the nature of mind: is it physical (material) or not? It is exactly in this respect that the usual dualism-interactionism – the theory supposing the existence of the nonphysical *mental self* (soul) and its interaction with the body (the brain) – is opposed to materialism and epiphenomenalism. Materialists and epiphenomenalists believe in the “causal closure of the physical”: the physical cannot be influenced by something nonphysical. Interactionists believe that 1) there is no reason why the nonphysical cannot influence the physical, and 2) the mind is nonphysical and it interacts (influences and is influenced) with the physical (the human body, the brain). The concept of physical has to be defined in such a way that leaves this issue open, that does not beg the question by “deciding” it in advance *by definition*. It would be incorrect to define the concept of physical in such a way that whatever influences physical processes would be physical *by definition*. If something *influences* physical processes (movements), this *is not a reason* for categorizing it as physical. However, if something *is nothing but* a constant measure or pattern of influences on movements (is conceptually reducible to spatial location and its changes with time), this *is a sufficient reason* to categorize it as physical. If the mind (consciousness) *is nothing but* some patterns of behaviour or/and of physical movements inside the body, then it is physical. However, if it *is* “in itself” *something else (besides)*, which *influences* behaviour and physical movements inside the body, then it is not physical.

In fact, it seems that subjective feelings or thoughts, unlike mass or electrical charge, are something “in itself”, besides influences on the movements. We know about them independently of any knowledge about the spatial locations and movements of physical bodies. And there is nothing in whatever multitude of spatial locations and movements to infer subjective experiences and conscious awareness. This gives reason to think that the mind (consciousness), as the realm of the subjective, is non-physical, although we know that it influences physical events – our behaviour. In connection with the aforesaid, it is appropriate to warn against one fairly frequent mistake. The mistake consists in this: starting with a (true) statement that X has physical properties one draws the *invalid* conclusion that X is physical (material); this conclusion, in its turn, serves as a premise for the conclusion that *all* properties of X are physical. For example: from the (true)

statement that humans have physical properties (those of their bodies) one draws the conclusion that humans are physical (material) beings and, so, their minds too are physical. Such a conclusion is invalid. *Having physical properties does not mean being (nothing but) a physical (material) entity.* The entity in question can be dual-natured, having both physical and nonphysical properties, or consisting of two parts, physical and nonphysical. The fact that human beings have physical properties is equally consistent with both materialism and dualism. The fact that someone *has* a body does not mean that she *is* (nothing but) a body.

Or let us suppose that human beings have souls. The folk psychology usually imagines a soul as having some bodily properties – a body-like appearance. A soul is often attributed with a bodily aspect, a so-called "thin body". Suppose that these notions are true. Does it follow that the soul is physical? By no means. What is decisive for the distinction between physical and nonphysical is not the presence/absence of physical properties, but the absence/presence of *nonphysical* properties. Thus, it is wrong to think that if something has spatial (and in general, physical) properties, then it is physical (material), and all the rest of its properties have to be categorized as physical. On the contrary, if something has some nonphysical (conceptually irreducible to spatiotemporal) properties, then it is nonphysical or dual. The existence of something having both physical and nonphysical properties would mean the *falsity of materialism*.

The same can be formulated in the form of a statement about the *contents and meanings of the relevant concepts* (this is pertinent because quite a large part of modern debates on the mind-body problem turns around the meaning/content of such concepts as "mind", "consciousness", "feeling", "pain", etc.): If the content of a concept is *entirely or partially* independent from the purposes of description and prediction of spatial locations and their changes with time (physical movements), i.e., is conceptually irreducible to the spatiotemporal properties, then this concept *means something non-physical or dual*. (Surely, the concept with a nonphysical meaning by itself is not sufficient to refute materialism; it is necessary that there really existed something that corresponds with its nonphysical meaning.)

Here, the following reservation has to be made: *conceptual reducibility* is not the same as *logical, deductive reducibility (deducibility)*. The physical laws and corresponding properties (mass, electric charge, etc.) *are conceptually reducible* to observable spatial dynamics of physical bodies (changes of their spatial locations with time) but *are not logically reducible to (deducible from) it*. *The content of general theories* (about universal laws of nature) *and the corresponding concepts* (designating those properties that these theories introduce) *are conceptually reducible to the observable facts that these theories and concepts generalize and predict*. This means that all the meaning and purpose (*raison d'être*) of such theories and concepts (for example, a supposition about the existence of a certain law of nature) consists in generalizations and predictions of such observable facts. Every *physical concept* (of a property or a law) is a theoretical construction, such that its meaning consists entirely in generalizing and predicting observable spatial locations of physical bodies and their changes with time (movements). On the

other hand, *general theories and the content of the corresponding concepts are never logically (deductively) reducible to (deducible from) any multitude of really observed facts*. It is so, because every general theory contains hypothetical statements (*predictions*) about an infinite multitude of *facts that were not observed by anyone* (in particular, of future facts). For example, Newton's gravitation theory tells about interactions between *all* physical bodies – in the past, the present, and the future. The number of such interactions is infinite. All real observations, however numerous, can cover only some *finite multitude* of interactions. So, the theory is based on (checked by) hundreds, thousands, or millions of past observations, but it tells about an *infinite multitude* of past, present, and future events. The theory that tells about the *infinite multitude of all possible* gravitational interactions is *logically irreducible* to whatever *finite multitude of really observed* interactions. But it is *conceptually reducible to them* – for it was invented for the purposes of their generalization and predictions.

Conclusions:

1. In the context of the mind-body problem, the constitutive concepts are of mind as a personal realm of subjectivity, of a mental subject and of physical reality (matter) as all that is *conceptually reducible* to spatial locations of physical bodies and changes of these locations with time.

2. It is important to distinguish the phenomenal concept of mind (as a personal realm of subjectivity) from the behaviouristic-functionalist concept of the mind and to realize that an explanation of the “mind” in the behaviouristic-functionalist sense is not an explanation of the mind in a usual (phenomenal) sense and, therefore, is not a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.

3. The concept of physical reality (matter) as objective reality fail to make sense of the discussions between materialism, idealism, dualism, and panpsychism.

4. The concept of physical reality (matter) as *conceptually reducible to spatial locations of physical bodies and changes of these locations with time* (which is a direct development of Descartes' concept of the “extended substance”) fits the sense of the discussions between materialism, idealism, dualism, and panpsychism and is independent of the development of physical theories of matter.

5. The mind-body problem, or the hard problem of consciousness, is the problem of the possibility for a phenomenal mind or a mental subject, *for which subjectivity is determinative*, to be composed of physical (material) structures and processes, which *at the fundamental level are entirely devoid of subjectivity* and are conceptually reducible to spatial locations of physical bodies, changes of these locations with time, and regularities in these spatiotemporal processes.

In this context, there is a need of a further investigation of the possibilities of a materialistic overcoming the hard problem of consciousness, as well as of advantages and drawbacks of dualistic, idealistic and panpsychist approaches to understanding the relationship between the mind and physical reality.

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ПОНЯТИЯ МАТЕРИИ И СОЗНАНИЯ В КОНТЕКСТЕ ПСИХОФИЗИЧЕСКОЙ ПРОБЛЕМЫ

В статье рассматривается проблема определения содержания понятий сознания и материи, которое является смыслообразующим для психофизической проблемы, позволяя корректно представить расхождения между позициями материализма, дуализма, идеализма и панпсихизма, и которое является независимым от многообразия существующих научных теорий и их исторического развития. Обосновывается точка зрения, что этим требованиям отвечает феноменальное понятие сознания как личной сферы субъективности и понятие материи (физической реальности) как концептуально сводимого к пространственному расположению и его изменениям с течением времени (физическому движению).

Ключевые слова: сознание, материя, физический, психический, пространственный, закономерность, субъективный, феноменальный.

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THE CONCEPTS OF MIND AND MATTER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

The article deals with the problem of the contents of the concepts of mind and matter that 1) is constitutive for the mind-body problem, so that it allows to represent correctly the principal differences between the positions of materialism, dualism, idealism, and panpsychism, and 2) is independent of the variety of existing scientific theories and their historical development. It is argued that the concepts that satisfy these requirements are the phenomenal concept of mind as a personal realm of subjectivity and the concept of matter (physical reality) as conceptually reducible to spatial location and its changes with time (physical movement).

Keywords: *mind, matter, physical, mental, spatial, regularity, subjective, phenomenal.*